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I. Introduction
The global financial crisis in 2008 caused large government deficits, 
leading to an increase in government debt. Many countries are 
currently attempting to find a balance between using extensive fiscal 
policy and returning to a sustainable path for public finances without 
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hurting economic recovery based on expansionary fiscal consolidation 
hypothesis. Not all countries have accepted this hypothesis, and a 
strong disagreement over the necessity for harsh and abrupt austerity 
measures continues to exist.
Historically, efforts to provide evidence in favor of expansionary fiscal 
consolidation have been consistent. The possibility of “non-Keynesian 
expansionary effects” resulting from restrictive fiscal policies was first 
raised by Barro (1974). This issue drew more interest after Giavazzi, and 
Pagano (1990) provided evidence of expansionary fiscal consolidation in 
Denmark (1983–86) and Ireland (1987–89).
Several recently observed examples trigger doubt about the 
appropriateness of fiscal consolidation and raise suspicion that such 
activity undermines economy. In the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis in 2008, the UK began a fiscal austerity program to reduce its 
deficit from the third quarter of 2010. Conservative politicians argued 
that fiscal consolidation could enhance growth, and they underlined 
the need to avoid rising debt costs as a key motivation in undertaking 
this program. However, in the last quarter of 2011 and first quarter of 
2012, the UK suffered from its first double-dip recession in 37 years. 
The economy of the UK unexpectedly slumped by 0.2 per cent of GDP in 
the first quarter of 2012. This slump followed a fall of 0.3 per cent in the 
final quarter of 2011.
In this context, this paper reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature that has investigated the conditions under which fiscal 
consolidation is effective in enhancing economic growth and reducing 
public debt (or fiscal deficit). We adopted a policy action-based approach 
instead of using a cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB)-based 
approach, which was commonly used in previous research. A policy 
action-based approach was newly proposed by the IMF (IMF 2010; Leigh 
et al. 2011) to improve the function of identifying fiscal consolidation 
episodes. 
Unlike the study of the IMF (IMF 2010; Leigh et al. 2011), this paper 
addresses the endogeneity problem in the analysis using a dynamic 
panel GMM model. The fixed-effects dynamic panel model of the IMF 
(Leigh et al. 2011) suffers from the endogeneity problem because it 
simply uses OLS estimates, which are inconsistent because of the 
correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the error term.
This paper contributes to uncovering the effects of fiscal consolidation 
on economic growth. This paper is organized as follows. Section II 
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reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of fiscal 
consolidation. Section III identifies fiscal consolidation episodes and 
specifies model. Section IV explains the data. Section V shows empirical 




Keynesian analysis insists that fiscal consolidation inevitably leads 
to a contraction of aggregate demand and reduces GDP. It disagrees 
with the non-Keynesian effects that fiscal austerity is necessary to 
overcome economic crisis even if the world economy remains deeply 
depressed. Keynesians argue that if an economy performs well following 
government spending cuts, then this performance is because the 
business cycle has picked up or the government monetary policy is 
more expansionary at the time.
Over the last two decades, the Keynesian view has been contended. 
Using the cases of Denmark and Ireland, Giavazzi, and Pagano (1990)1 
suggest that fiscal consolidation can be expansionary, because the GDP of 
these two countries increased after fiscal tightening. Alesina, and Ardagna 
(2010, 2012) also show that spending-based reduction has caused smaller 
recession and occasionally growth in GDP.
Several channels can explain how fiscal consolidation may not 
be recessionary or may occasionally be expansionary. Theoretically, 
expansionary effects of fiscal consolidation can go through both the 
demand and supply sides (Figure 1).
On the demand side, the first channel is a rapid reduction of 
interest rates. If a government reduces its spending and reduces the 
deficit, then people worry less about the future and apply a lower risk 
premium to the country’s government debt. That is, reduced interest 
rates can stimulate aggregate demand through both private investment 
(McDermott, and Wescott 1996) and consumption because of the 
positive wealth effect in the private sector (Giavazzi, and Pagano 1990).
1 Blanchard (1990) extrapolates from Giavazzi and Pagano’s analysis to 
suggest that fiscal consolidation can raise investment, aggregate demand, and 
output.
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The second channel is taxes. If a government cuts its spending, then 
it gives a signal that future taxes will be lower, or, at least, will not be 
raised. This expectation of future tax reduction encourages people to 
increase private consumption and investment (Bertola, and Drazen 
1993; Prammer 2004).
The third channel is depreciation. If the currency of a country 
is depreciated after a fiscal consolidation, then it can improve the 
country’s competitiveness in exports. 
Another possibility concerns the effect on investment confidence. 
A significant effect on investment confidence may be observed when 
a country announces a credible fiscal consolidation.2 In countries 
2 This effect is opposite to crowing-out effect, which decreases private 
investment caused by expansionary government spending.
Figure 1
Several ChannelS of expanSionary fiSCal ConSolidation (non-KeyneSian view)
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such as the US, an increase in confidence among investors is crucial 
to reduce the negative effects of fiscal consolidation. If a government 
reduces uncertainty about the future fiscal policy, then investors will be 
less hesitant about investing their money in the country (Alesina, and 
Ardagna 2010, 2012). 
On the supply side, the expansionary effects of fiscal consolidation 
work through the labor market. The first channel is the private-sector 
wage-depressing effect. If public sector wages are kept down, then wage-
depressing agreements in the private sector of the economy may follow. 
Finally, competitiveness may increase, thus improving productivity.3
The second channel is taxes. If a government cuts its spending, then 
it signals tax reductions in the future. This expectation of future tax 
reductions will encourage employees to increase their labor supply, 
resulting in a decrease of pre-tax real wage. This decrease signifies lower 
labor unit costs for firms and considerable gain in competitiveness.
Despite the various types of theoretical support for expansionary 
fiscal consolidation, opposition to non-Keynesian expansionary effects 
has been growing since countries attempted to implement austerity 
measures early in 2010. For instance, Krugman (2010) strongly 
disagrees with the idea that fiscal consolidation can have expansionary 
effects and argues that non-Keynesian effects are based on sheer 
speculation by the policy elite rather than evidence or careful analysis. 
He insists that because of austerity measures, Europe’s troubled debtor 
nations are suffering greater economic decline than necessary, and 
confidence is plunging rather than rising. Baker (2010) also insists that 
fiscal consolidation measures in the US will result in further contraction 
of the US economy. He argues that although a budget deficit can 
basically lead to higher interest rates, investment reduction, and lower 
productivity growth when the economy is in a normal condition, it can 
boost the recessionary economy in both short and long terms when the 
economy is facing a serious downturn.
Briotti (2005) claimed that several assumptions are satisfied in 
the theoretical rationale for non-Keynesian expansionary fiscal 
consolidation. First, taxes must be distortionary. The larger the tax 
3 This argument is controversial because substantial literature follows the 
opposite direction. For example, Blundell et al. (2013) show that the UK’s 
productivity went down when the real wages were reduced during the recession 
from 2007–11. 
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increases, the larger the distortionary effects. Under this assumption, 
the delay of fiscal consolidation may cause significant negative effects 
on future output via consumers’ expectation of tax rise. Second, 
consumers should look forward, with rational expectations, and 
not constrained by liquidity; thus, higher expected income can be 
translated to higher effective demand. Third, fiscal consolidation should 
win people’s credibility. Finally, to create optimism, fiscal consolidation 
must be unexpected (Briotti, 2005, p. 12). However, even if the 
existence of non-Keynesian expansionary fiscal consolidation effects 
is theoretically reasonable, gathering empirical evidence is challenging 
because of the difficulty in building credibility with people. In real life, 
gaining credibility from the people appears to be a particularly slow and 
difficult process for a government. Assessing the results of empirical 
studies and checking the relevance of these theoretical assumptions are 
necessary. 
B. Empirical Approach
a) Identifying Fiscal Consolidation Episodes
For empirical studies, identifying a correct notion of fiscal 
consolidation is important. The periods identified as exceptional fiscal 
consolidation episodes differ from study to study because of the 
arbitrariness of the different definitions of fiscal consolidation episodes. 
As the definition and measurement of fiscal consolidation episodes are 
not fully agreed on, no universally accepted methodology for identifying 
them exists. Two approaches can be considered regarding the 
identification of fiscal consolidation episodes, namely, the CAPB-based 
approach and the policy action-based approach. The CAPB is calculated 
by taking the actual primary balance (non-interest government 
revenue minus non-interest government spending) and subtracting the 
estimated effect of business cycle fluctuations on fiscal accounts (IMF 
2010). CAPB can be measured in three ways: (1) Hodrick–Prescott filter, 
(2) elasticity approach by OECD and IMF, and (3) Blanchard Fiscal 
Impulse (BFI) (see Appendix A for details).
(a) CAPB-Based Approach
The CAPB-based approach identifies fiscal consolidation episodes 
using a statistical concept, which is the change in the CAPB. It removes 
two components from the government budget balance: (i) interest 
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payments, which cannot be directly influenced in the short term by 
government fiscal policies, and (ii) any component of the government 
balance resulted from a business cycle (McDermott, and Wescott 
1996). This approach is based on the assumption that changes in the 
CAPB reflect policymakers’ decisions to adjust taxes and government 
spending. Nevertheless, the ways in which CAPB is defined as a fiscal 
consolidation episode vary.
Alesina, and Perotti (1995) define a fiscal consolidation episode as 
a year in which the BFI4 is between -1.5 and -0.5 percent of GDP or a 
year in which the BFI is less than -1.5 per cent of GDP. Giavazzi, and 
Pagano (1996) define fiscal consolidation episodes as years of cumulative 
changes in the CAPB that are at least 5, 4, 3 per cent points of GDP in 4, 
3, or 2 years, respectively, or 3 per cent points in one year. Alesina, and 
Ardagna (1998) and Giudice et al. (2007) define a fiscal consolidation 
episode as a year in which the CAPB changes by at least 2 per cent 
points of GDP or a period of two consecutive years in which the CAPB 
changes by at least 1.5 per cent points of GDP per year in both years. 
Alesina, and Ardagna (2010) define a fiscal consolidation episode as a 
year in which the CAPB improves by at least 1.5 per cent points of GDP. 
Alesina, and Ardagna (2012) consider only multi-year consolidations, 
allowing for the possibility of small reductions in the primary deficit 
in a particular year, provided that it occurs in a period of consecutive 
years when sizable improvements in the fiscal balance are observed. 
They define a fiscal consolidation episode as a two-year period when 
the CAPB improves in each year and the cumulative improvement is 
at least 2 per cent points of GDP or a three-year period or longer when 
the CAPB improves in each year and the cumulative improvement is at 
least 3 per cent points of GDP. They use such multi-year criterion to 
include adjustments that are small but prolonged over several years. 
On the contrary, Afonso (2010) defines a fiscal episode as a period 
when either the change in the CAPB is at least one and a half times 
the standard deviation in one year or such a change is at least one 
standard deviation on average in the last two years.
4 Blanchard Fiscal Impulse (BFI) = (gt (Ut–1) – tt) – (gt–1 – tt–1), where gt is non-in-
terest government spending of GDP, tt is total revenue of GDP, and Ut is the 
unemployment rate (see Appendix A for details).
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(b) Policy Action-Based Approach
Pointing out the shortcomings5 of the CAPB-based approach, the IMF 
(2010) and Leigh et al. (2011) first use an alternative measure—a policy 
action-based approach—in identifying fiscal consolidation episodes. 
This alternative measure concurs with the narrative method pioneered 
by Romer, and Romer (1989) and developed by Ramey, and Shapiro 
(1998), Ramey (2011), and Romer, and Romer (2010) for monetary policy 
and fiscal policy. This approach identifies fiscal consolidation episodes 
directly from historical documents such as budget reports, presidential 
speeches, central bank reports, and congressional reports, focusing on 
fiscal policy changes (tax rises or government spending cuts) motivated 
by the desire to reduce the primary deficit. Fiscal consolidations 
motivated primarily by restraining domestic demand are not included in 
the episodes.
The IMF (2010) and Leigh et al. (2011) define fiscal consolidation 
episodes for a sample of 17 OECD countries over the period of 
1980-2009. Such fiscal consolidation actions are the response to 
past decisions and economic conditions rather than to prospective 
situations (Leigh et al. 2011, p. 4). As a result, these actions tend to be 
uncorrelated with other developments influencing output in the short 
term, which are good for measuring the macroeconomic effects of fiscal 
consolidation. Recently, the CAPB-based approach has been refined by 
reflecting the advantages of the narrative method. For instance, Yang 
et al. (2013) identify fiscal consolidation episodes by incorporating size, 
persistence, and country-specific heterogeneity into the CAPB-based 
approach.
b) Defining Expansionary Fiscal Consolidation Episodes
Alesina, and Ardagna (1998) define a period as an expansionary 
fiscal consolidation episode when the average growth rate of GDP in 
the period of the fiscal consolidation, as well as in the two years after, 
is greater than the average value of the same variable in all episodes of 
fiscal consolidation. Giudice et al. (2007) define a fiscal consolidation as 
expansionary if the average real GDP growth in each fiscal consolidation 
5 The CAPB-based approach can be affected by asset price cycles (Girouard, 
and Price 2004) and one-off measures (Von Hagen, and Wolff 2006) that do 
not reflect the policy stance. It is also affected by the measurement issues 
surrounding the output gap (Guichard et al. 2007).
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year, as well as in the two years after, is greater than the average real 
GDP growth in the two years before. Alesina, and Ardagna (2010) define 
a fiscal adjustment episode as expansionary if the average growth rate 
of real GDP in the first period of the episode, as well as in the two years 
after, is greater than the value of seventy fifth percentile of the same 
variable empirical density in all episodes of fiscal adjustments. Alesina, 
and Ardagna (2012) define a fiscal adjustment period as expansionary 
if actual GDP growth during the adjustment period is higher than the 
average growth the country experienced in the two years before.
Alesina, and Ardagna (2010, 2012) consider multi-year fiscal 
adjustments as a “single” episode because the time span chosen for the 
definition of “expansionary” starts from the first year of the episode. 
By contrast, Alesina, and Ardagna (1998) and Alesina et al. (1999) 
consider each year of a multi-year period as a single episode. In a 
multi-year episode, some years can be expansionary, but others may 
be contractionary. Nevertheless, preferring one choice over the other is 
unnecessary because the results are similar in both cases despite the 
different methods of selecting expansionary consolidation episodes that 
last more than one consecutive year (Molnar 2012).
c) Empirical Studies: Existence of Expansionary Fiscal Consolidation
Compared with empirical studies on the effects of expansionary 
fiscal shocks, studies on the effects of fiscal consolidation are limited. 
In terms of the effects of fiscal consolidation, the literature is divided 
into two views: that of the proponents of the Keynesian effects and non-
Keynesian effects. 
Based on a conventional Keynesian model, many empirical studies 
have supported the idea that fiscal consolidation is not expansionary in 
short term. They support the standard implication of Keynesian models 
that government spending cuts or tax rises exerts a contractionary 
effect on aggregate demand in the short term (Leigh et al. 2011). 
Recently, the IMF (2010) examined the effects of fiscal consolidation 
on economic activity using an action-based approach rather than 
a CAPB-based approach, and it concluded that fiscal consolidation 
typically reduces GDP and raises unemployment in the short term. The 
IMF (2010) also insisted that consolidation is more costly when it relies 
primarily on tax hikes and the sovereign default risk is low. Moreover, it 
insisted that reducing government debt tends to raise output. The IMF 
underlines that interest rate cuts, currency depreciation, and net export 
60 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
rise usually soothe the contractionary effect.6 
Similarly, Hernandez de Cos, and Moral-Benito (2011) investigate the 
potential effect of fiscal consolidation on economic growth, considering 
the endogeneity of fiscal consolidation to GDP. They argue that if an 
endogeneity problem exists between fiscal consolidation and GDP growth, 
then the positive correlation between the two may be the result of a 
positive effect from GDP growth to fiscal consolidation instead of vice 
versa. They conclude that if the endogeneity problem is considered, fiscal 
consolidation has negative effects on GDP growth in the short term. Based 
on this result, they argue that the endogeneity bias is chiefly responsible 
for the non-Keynesian results found in the previous literature.
Starting with Giavazzi, and Pagano (1990) and Bertola, and 
Drazen (1993), a sequence of studies finds that consolidations can be 
expansionary.7 Giavazzi, and Pagano (1990), in particular, point out 
the need for an academic debate on expansionary fiscal consolidation. 
Their study on the effects of fiscal policy in Denmark and Ireland in the 
1980s finds that drastic reductions in the cyclically adjusted deficits 
are followed by above-average economic growth. Since then, many 
studies have sought to identify whether and under what conditions 
fiscal contractions can provoke a positive economic response. These 
empirical studies initially identify periods of forceful and sizeable 
government spending cuts within a panel of OECD countries and then 
offer a descriptive analysis of the sample properties of macroeconomic 
aggregates, such as GDP, before, during, and after the year of the fiscal 
consolidation episode. 
McDermott, and Wescott (1996) also find that fiscal consolidation 
can have an expansionary effect on economic activity through various 
channels, such as interest rates and expectations. They insist that 
fiscal consolidation can reduce interest rate premiums, which promotes 
private investment, or they can trigger expectations of a falling 
6 On the contrary, Ardagna (2004) argues that expansionary fiscal 
consolidation is not the result of accompanying expansionary monetary policy or 
exchange rate depreciation.
7 Feldstein (1982) is probably the first to find evidence of the existence of 
expansionary fiscal consolidation. Showing a negative response of private 
consumption to a public expenditure shock, he argues that reductions in public 
expenditure may have expansionary effects on output if they are viewed as an 
indication of future tax cuts.
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future tax burden, which encourages consumption and investment, 
finally supporting economic growth. Estimating a probit model on 
expansionary fiscal consolidation, Alesina, and Ardagna (1998) find that 
the composition of fiscal consolidation is more important than its size in 
terms of causing fiscal consolidation to be expansionary. 
Giudice et al. (2007) analyze the main determinants of expansionary 
fiscal consolidation. By comparing statistics of expansionary versus 
non-expansionary fiscal consolidations, they find that the expansionary 
fiscal consolidations significantly differ from the non-expansionary 
ones in their composition: the fiscal consolidations based on spending 
cuts are more likely to be expansionary than those based on tax 
rises. According to the results of their probit regression model, the 
composition of fiscal consolidation and initial value of the output gap 
play significant roles in establishing expansionary fiscal consolidation. 
On the contrary, the size of fiscal consolidation, initial situation of debt-
to-GDP value, interest rates, and exchange rates are not significant 
factors to explain the success of expansionary fiscal consolidation.
By comparing the difference in basic statistics between expansionary 
and contractionary fiscal consolidations, Alesina, and Ardagna (2012) 
find that fiscal consolidations based on spending cuts have superior 
effects on GDP growth to those based on tax rises.
III. Methodology
In this section III, two econometric models are described after 
identifying fiscal consolidation episodes.
A. Identifying Fiscal Consolidation Episodes
The CAPB-based approach has strength in the simplicity and 
conciseness of its analysis. However, this approach has several possible 
shortcomings. 
First, the CAPB-based approach suffers from measurement errors 
that tend to be correlated with economic developments. Changes 
in the CAPB may include non-policy changes correlated with other 
developments affecting economic activity. For instance, a thriving stock 
market enhances the CAPB by augmenting capital gains and cyclically 
adjusted tax revenues. Such measurement errors may offset or reduce 
the shrinking effects of deliberate fiscal consolidation. Second, this 
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approach ignores the motives behind fiscal actions. Discretionary fiscal 
consolidation exhibits two principle motives. One is a desire to reduce the 
budget deficit to improve the government financial situation. The other 
is a desire to restrain domestic demand for cyclical reasons. The CAPB-
based approach includes all fiscal consolidations regardless of their 
motivation. Therefore, a rise in the CAPB may reflect a government’s 
decision to raise taxes or cut government spending to suppress domestic 
demand and decrease the risk of overheating. In this case, using a rise 
in the CAPB to measure the effects of fiscal consolidation on economic 
activity may suffer from “reverse causality” and may bias the analysis 
toward finding evidence of an expansionary or successful fiscal 
consolidation hypothesis (Leigh et al. 2011). 
In this context, the action-based approach of the IMF (2010)8 is used 
to identify fiscal consolidation episodes.
B. Model Specification: Test for the Expansionary Fiscal Consolidation
a) Baseline Model: A Dynamic Panel Data Analysis with GMM
Panel data analysis is used to estimate the following IMF model (2010), 
as this analysis has the advantage of providing much information, 
variability, and a great degree of freedom. In panel data analysis, a 
dynamic panel data model involving generalized method of moments 
(GMM) is created to address the endogeneity issue9, which has been 
ignored in the previous literature.
The baseline model is shown below. The autoregressive model in 
growth rates assumes that the estimated size of the action-based fiscal 
consolidation (ABFC) is exogenous and uncorrelated with changes in 
8 The two approaches are exposed to the same risks. First, if a country delays 
fiscal consolidation until the economy improves, then the fiscal consolidation 
episode will be affected by good economic outcomes. Second, if a country 
maintains a deficit-reduction policy and the economy recedes, then the country 
may try additional fiscal consolidation measures. As a result, fiscal consolidation 
is associated with unfavorable economic outcomes (IMF, 2010, p. 97).
9 In the fixed-effects dynamic panel model including lagged values of the 
dependent variable as regressors, OLS estimates are inconsistent because of the 
correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the error term. In this case, 
Arellano-Bond GMM estimator can be a good alternative method (Biorn, and 
Klette 1999). 
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fiscal policy in all other periods.10
 α β γ µ− −= == + + + +∑ ∑
2 2
, ,1 0
,it j i t j s i t s i t itj sg g ABFC v  (1)
where git is the percent change in real GDP, ABFCit equals the estimated 
size of the ABFC as a per cent of GDP in periods of fiscal adjustment, 
and zero otherwise, γi is a vector of country-fixed effects to capture 
differences among countries’ normal growth rates, μt is a vector of year-
fixed effects to take account of global shocks, such as shifts in oil prices 
or the global business cycle, and νit is a mean-zero error term. Subscript 
i indexes countries and subscript t indexes years (IMF, 2010, p. 98). 
The αs are autoregressive coefficients capturing the normal dynamics 
of GDP, whereas the βs11 are the direct effects (contemporaneous and 
lagged) of the action-based measures of fiscal consolidation. Lags 
capture the delayed effects of fiscal consolidation on growth. This 
approach controls for lags of GDP growth to distinguish the effect of 
fiscal consolidation from that of normal GDP dynamics. The lag order 
of 2 is selected based on a review of the information criteria and serial 
correlation properties associated with various lag lengths.
The difficulty of estimating this simple regression model is that the 
lagged dependent variables are correlated with the error term (vit), even 
if vit is assumed not auto-correlated. A dynamic panel data model with 
GMM estimator can be used to address this problem.12 Equation (1) is 
estimated over the entire sample period by dynamic panel GMM, and 
the estimated responses for ABFCit at t, t – 1, t – 2 are cumulated to 
10 An endogeneity issue remains related to the occurrence of fiscal con-
solidation because macroeconomic conditions may affect the discretionary policy 
choices of fiscal authority. The budget for the current year is approved during 
the second half of the previous year and, although additional measures can be 
taken during the course of the year, they usually become effective with delay, 
toward the end of the fiscal year (Alesina, and Ardagna 2009).
11 Following the previous panel data literature, the slope homogeneity 
restrictions (for all) are imposed on the model to focus on an average estimate of 
the slope coefficients. 
12 We have also estimated Equation (1) using the two-stage least-squares first-
differenced estimator (FD2SLS) considering that Anderson, and Hsiao (1981) 
used a version of FD2SLS to fit a panel-data model with lagged dependent 
variables. The results are similar to those of the dynamic panel GMM (see 
Appendix C).
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measure the effect of a 1 per cent of GDP fiscal consolidation.
A dynamic panel data model with GMM estimator obtains first 
differences to eliminate unobserved country-fixed effects and uses 
lagged instruments to correct for simultaneity in the first-differenced 




,it j i t j s i t s t itj sg g ABFC vα β λ− −= =∆ = ∆ + ∆ + + ∆∑ ∑  (2)
The dynamic panel data model contains lagged dependent variables 
(which are endogenous variables), exogenous variables, country-fixed 
effects, and time-fixed effects. In cases of either fixed or random effects, 
the heterogeneity, such as country-fixed effects, can disappear from 
the model by obtaining the first differences of the original model ahead. 
The time variables μt do not disappear by deriving first differences. The 
time effect was not restricted initially, and, thus, Δμt = λt remains an 
unrestricted time effect, which is treated as “fixed” and modeled with a 
time-specific dummy variable. 
Correlations remain between the differenced lagged dependent variables 
Δɡi,t – j and the differenced error term Δvit in the modified equation. To 
remove the correlations between the regressors and the differenced error 
term, the differenced lagged dependent variables (Δɡi,t – j ) are instrumented 
with the past levels of ɡi,t. This approach is called “difference GMM 
approach.” When finding suitable instrumental variables, the instruments 
should be highly correlated with the lagged dependent variables but 
uncorrelated with the differenced error term Δvit. 
However, the application of the difference GMM estimators tends 
to produce unsatisfactory results if correlations between differenced 
lagged dependent variables and their instrumental variables are weak 
(Mairesse, and Hall 1996). To reduce this problem, Arellano, and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell, and Bond (1998) suggest including the lagged first 
differences as instruments for equations in levels in addition to the 
usual lagged levels as instruments for equations in first differences. 
This method is commonly called as “system GMM approach.” 
b) Extension Model Specification
In the baseline model above Equation (1), the coefficient of ABFCit 
is assumed β regardless of country i, even if this assumption can be 
criticized because it may excessively restrictive considering the different 
conditions of each country. The effects of fiscal consolidation on the 
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economy can differ depending on the situation of each country. This 
criticism can be addressed to a certain degree by subdividing the ABFC 
into two variables considering the special factors influencing the effects 
of fiscal consolidation on economy. 
First, to investigate the role of debt-to-GDP ratio, the sample is 
divided into two sub-samples according to the level of debt-to-GDP 
ratio. Reinhart, and Rogoff (2010) find that a country’s output falls 
substantially as soon as its total public debt passes 90 per cent of GDP. 
Using 20 advanced economies since 1945, they find that GDP growth 
had been between 3 and 4 per cent when public debt had been below 
90 per cent of GDP, but that GDP growth had collapsed to an average 
of –0.1 per cent when public debt had risen above 90 per cent of GDP. 
They argue that the relationship between public debt and actual GDP 
growth gains strength for debt-to-GDP ratios above a threshold of 90 
per cent of GDP. According to their analysis, actual GDP growth rates 
fall over one per cent in the case of debt-to-GDP ratios above 90 per 
cent. Following their argument, the two sub-samples are grouped by the 
threshold of 90 per cent debt-to-GDP ratios.13 These two sub-samples 
are as follows: fiscal consolidations occurring with public debt-to-GDP 
ratios above 90 per cent of GDP and those occurring with public debt-
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Second, the role of the composition of fiscal consolidation in terms 
of government spending and taxes can be investigated. The fiscal 
consolidation of the baseline model can be divided into two types: 
spending-based and tax-based fiscal consolidation.14 
13 Sensitivity analysis uses alternative criteria for debt-to-GDP ratios (see 
Appendix B).
14 “Tax-based type” is defined as a fiscal consolidation in which the 
contribution of tax rises to the consolidation is greater than that of government 
spending cuts, and “spending-based type” is defined as a fiscal consolidation in 
which the contribution of government spending cuts is greater than that of tax 
rises (IMF, 2010, p. 98). 
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Third, the role of perceived sovereign default risk15 can also be 
estimated. To this end, fiscal consolidation of the baseline model can 
be divided into two types: fiscal consolidation with high (below-median) 
perceived sovereign default risk in the year before fiscal consolidation 
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Data on 18 OECD countries from 1978 to 2011 are used. These 
countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Korea, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US. All fiscal and 
macroeconomic data are from the OECD Economic Outlook Database 
No. 92. In the 18 OECD countries, fiscal consolidation episodes are 
selected according to the criterion of a policy action-based approach 
described in the previous section. The sample size is relatively small in 
terms of time series and cross-sectional data. The budgetary effects of 
the fiscal consolidation are scaled by GDP. 
The data for general government are used rather than those for 
central government. This data selection has one advantage and 
one disadvantage. The advantage is that the definition of general 
government is more comparable across countries. According to the 
OECD, general government consists of “all departments, offices, 
organizations and other bodies which are agencies or instruments 
15 The Institutional Investor Ratings (IIR) index is used as a proxy measure 
of the perceived sovereign default risk. IIR index is based on assessment of 
sovereign default risk by private sector analysts. They rate each country on a 
scale of 0 to 100, with a rating of 100 assigned to the lowest perceived sovereign 
default risk probability.
67Macro econoMic effects of fiscal consolidation
of the central, state or local public authorities,” including “all social 
security arrangements for large sections of the population imposed, 
controlled or financed by a government’,” and “government enterprises 
which mainly produce goods and services for government itself or 
primarily sell goods and services to the public on a small scale.” Using 
general government data avoids the problem of allocating expenditures 
to state rather than local governments or to the central administration 
rather than to social security funds, which can be occasionally difficult 
and unreliable in a cross-country comparison. The disadvantage of 
using general government data is that discretionary fiscal policies are 
usually undertaken through the central government budget. However, 
fluctuations in the general government balance may reflect effects 
coming from local governments, which may not be a matter of interest 
(Alesina, and Perotti 1995).
V. Empirical Results
A. Baseline Model Analysis 
a) Arellano-Bond Difference GMM Estimation
(a) Results of Estimation
Arellano, and Bond (1991) first use the Arellano-Bond estimator by 
constructing instrumental variables in a GMM context with a dynamic 
panel data model. Later, Roodman (2009) devises a more efficient 
Arellano-Bond estimator.16
By deriving the first differences of the original model, the country-
fixed effects (including the constant term) can be removed. Time 
variables μt are not transformed by deriving first differences.
 α β γ µ− −= == + + + +∑ ∑
2 2
, ,1 0
.it j i t j s i t s i t itj sg g ABFC v  (6)
When the above equation is first differenced, it is changed to the 
following equation:
16 Arellano-Bond’s coefficient is derived using “xtabond” command in Stata, 
whereas Roodman’s coefficient is obtained using “xtabond2” command in 
Stata. The “xtabond2” command introduces finer control than “xtabond” over 
the instrument matrix. It also establishes the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample 
correction to the reported standard errors in two-step estimation, without which 
those standard errors tend to be severely downward biased. 
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 α β λ− −= =∆ = ∆ + ∆ + + ∆∑ ∑
2 2
, ,1 0
.it j i t j s i t s t itj sg g ABFC v  (7)
In estimation, the maximum lag of an instrument is limited to four 
to prevent the number of instruments from becoming excessively large 
and address a possible loss of efficiency (Baum, 2006, p. 234). Only lags 
of two to five years are used as GMM instruments in this model. The 
Table 1


























No. of observations 543 543














Notes: 1.  The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here 
to save space. 
          2.  ***, **, and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
          3. p-values are in parentheses. 
          4.  The Wald statistic is a test of the joint significance of the independent 
variables asymptotically distributed as χ2k under the null of no 
relationship, where k is the number of coefficients estimated (excluding 
time dummies).
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estimation results of the growth rate function are shown in Table 1. 
The main result of estimation is that fiscal consolidation is not 
expansionary but contractionary. GDP growth responds negatively 
to contemporaneous and lagged changes in action-based fiscal 
consolidation, indicating that fiscal consolidation typically reduces 
GDP growth. The results are statistically significant at the 10 per cent 
significance level at the least. Based on the above results, the idea of 
non-Keynesian effects that fiscal consolidation stimulates economic 
activity even in the short term cannot be supported empirically. The 
results are in line with those of Leigh et al. (2011) who used a policy 
action-based approach.
(b) Tests for the Validity of Over-Identifying Restrictions
The Sargan–Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions has been 
conducted in over-identified model estimated with instrumental 
variables techniques. The Sargan’s J-statistic has a null hypothesis 
that “the instruments as a group are exogenous.” This test is based on 
the idea that the residuals should be uncorrelated with the exogenous 
variables if the instruments are exogenous. In our estimation, the 
null hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions are valid is rejected. 
However, this result cannot be fully credible because the Sargan’s 
J-statistic is not powerful when many instrumental variables and 
heteroscedasticity in the error term exist (Arellano, and Bond 1991). 
When we employ Hansen’s J-statistic to address heteroscedasticity in 
the error term, the null hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions are 
valid is not rejected.
(c) Autocorrelation Test for the Differenced Error Term
The Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test is an important diagnostic 
test of the residuals in the dynamic panel data estimation. With a 
null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, this test estimates the first- 
and second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals. By 
construction, the residuals of the Equation (7) Δvit should be serially 
correlated. However, if we assume serial independence in the original 
errors, the differenced residuals should not follow significant AR (2) 
process. If a significant AR (2) statistic exists, then the second lags of 
endogenous variables cannot be proper instruments for current values 
(Baum 2012). 
Table 2 shows the results of autocorrelation test. The test for first-
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order serial correlation AR (1) process rejects the null hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation at the 1 per cent significance level. By contrast the 
test for the AR (2) process cannot reject the null hypothesis that no 
second-order serial correlation exists at the 5 per cent significance 
level. Consequently, we can conclude that the instruments used are 
appropriate. This outcome is expected in a first-differenced equation 
with the original untransformed error terms assumed not serially 
correlated (Baltagi, 2008, p. 158).
b) System GMM Estimation17
(a) Results of Estimation
The application of GMM estimators, which derive first differences to 
eliminate unobserved country-fixed effects and use lagged instruments 
to correct for simultaneity in the first-differenced equations, tends 
to produce unsatisfactory results (Mairesse, and Hall 1996). These 
problems are related to the weak correlations between endogenous 
explanatory variables and their instrumental variables in the first-
differenced GMM estimators.
Arellano, and Bover (1995) and Blundell, and Bond (1998) point out 
that the lagged level variables are poor instruments for identifying 
first-differenced variables, especially if the level variables are following 
random walk processes. To reduce this problem, they suggest including 
17 We additionally employ system GMM approach to address the concern 
that the instrument variables of difference GMM approach may have weak 
correlations with the differenced lagged dependent variables.
Table 2

















Notes: 1.  ***, **, and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
         2. p-values are in parentheses.
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lagged first differences as instruments for equation in levels (e.g. 
Equation (6)) in addition to the usual lagged levels as instruments for 
equation in first-differences (e.g. Equation (7)). This expanded approach 
is commonly termed system GMM estimation. The level of GDP growth 
rate follows random walk process; thus, obtaining results of estimation 
using the system GMM estimator is superior.
The results using the system GMM estimator are shown in Table 3. 
These results are the same as those of the difference GMM estimator. The 
system GMM estimator produces a higher estimate of the coefficient on 
lagged growth rates because of using additional instrumental variables. 
This result agrees with that of Blundell, and Bond (1998), who show 
that the system GMM estimator does not have the downward bias that 
Arellano-Bond’s difference GMM estimator has when the true value is 
Table 3
reSultS of the Blundell-Bond dynamiC panel data SyStem Gmm
Dependent variable: g


























No. of observations 561
Instruments for first 
differences equation
GMM-type: L(2/5).g
Standard: D.(abfc, labfc, l2abfc)




Wald test: χ2(k) 1059.51 (5)
(0.000)
Notes: 1.  The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here 
to save space. 
          2.  ***, **, and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
          3. P denotes p-value.
          4.  The Wald statistic is a test of the joint significance of the independent 
variables asymptotically distributed as χ2k under the null of no 
relationship, where k is the number of coefficients estimated (excluding 
time dummies).
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high.
(b) Tests for the Validity of Over-Identifying Restrictions
According to the Sargan’s J-statistic, the null hypothesis that over-
identifying restrictions are valid is rejected. However, as mentioned in 
the previous subsection, this result is not completely reliable because 
the Sargan’s J-statistic is not powerful when many instrumental 
variables and heteroscedasticity in the error term exist. When we 
employ Hansen’s J-statistic to address heteroscedasticity in the error 
term, the null hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions are valid is 
not rejected. 
(c) Autocorrelation Test for the Differenced Error Term
The test for the AR (1) process in the first differences rejects the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the 1 per cent significance level. 
The test for the AR (2) process cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
no second-order serial correlation exists at the 10 per cent significance 
level. We conclude that the instruments that we used are appropriate. 
B. Extension to the Analysis
In this section, the effects of sub-divided fiscal consolidation on GDP 
growth are estimated using extended models. In doing so, the strength 
of the factors’ influence on economic activity—especially GDP growth 
rates—can be measured.
First, to investigate the role of the debt-to-GDP ratio, the variable 
ABFC is divided according to the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio. An 
ABFC can be classified into two sub-groups: fiscal consolidations 
occurring with public debt-to-GDP ratios above 90 per cent of GDP 
(ABFCi,t
HD ) and those occurring with public debt-to-GDP ratios below 90 
Table 4
arellano-Bond teStS for autoCorrelation
Order z p-value
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences





Note:  ***, **, and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% significance levels, respectively.
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per cent of GDP (ABFCi,t
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reSultS of Gmm eStimation ConSiderinG differenCe in deBt-to-Gdp ratioS
Dependent variable: g









































No. of observations 544
Instruments for first 
differences equation
Standard:
D.(abfc_hd, labfc_hd, l2abfc_hd abfc_ld, labfc_ld,  
l2abfc_ld )
GMM-type: L(2/5).(L.g L2.g)
Wald test: χ2(k) 668.29 (8)
(0.000)
Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(1) in first 
differences
Z = –7.46 (p-value = 0.000)
Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(2) in first 
differences
Z = –1.26 (p-value = 0.207)
Notes: 1.  The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here 
to save space. 
          2.  ***, **, and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
          3.  P denotes p-value. 
          4.  The Wald statistic is a test of the joint significance of the independent 
variables asymptotically distributed as χ2k under the null of no relation-
ship, where k is the number of coefficients estimated (excluding time 
dummies).
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The results of the estimation are shown in Table 5. The results 
suggest that the effects of fiscal consolidation on GDP growth are all 
contractionary, regardless of the level of debt-to-GDP ratios. However, 
the degree of effects of fiscal consolidation differs depending on the 
public debt level. The fiscal consolidation in low debt-to-GDP ratios may 
exert significant negative effects on GDP growth, whereas those in time 
period of high debt-to-GDP ratios exert insignificant negative effects on 
GDP growth at the 5 per cent significance level. Basically, the empirical 
results are inconsistent with the non-Keynesian effects hypothesis that 
fiscal consolidation can expand economic activity by executing fiscal 
austerity measures in an economic crisis. The results also imply that if 
fiscal consolidation is unavoidable, fiscal consolidation in the situation 
of high debt-to-GDP ratios may be less harmful to economic activity. 
This finding is partially in line with the idea of Reinhart, and Rogoff 
(2010) who support governments’ austerity measure in time of high 
public debt. 
Second, the role of the composition of fiscal consolidation in terms 
of government spending and taxes is investigated. The ABFC is divided 
into two types in a baseline model: spending-based (ABFCi,t
S  ) and tax-
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where the coefficient on ABFCi,
S
t –p, β1, p, is the effects of a spending-based 
fiscal consolidation and the coefficient on ABFCi,
T
t –p, β2, p, is the effects of 
a tax-based one. 
The results of the effects of the two types of fiscal consolidation 
are shown in Table 6, which indicates that the effects of these two 
types of fiscal consolidation on GDP growth are both negative. In 
particular, spending-based fiscal consolidation is less contractionary 
for GDP growth than tax-based fiscal consolidation. Based on the 
results, no evidence of any expansionary effects of fiscal consolidation 
18 “Tax-based type” is defined as a fiscal consolidation in which the 
contribution of tax rises to the consolidation is greater than that of spending 
cuts, whereas “spending-based type” is defined as a fiscal consolidation in which 
the contribution of spending cuts is greater than that of tax rises. 
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exists regardless of its composition. In addition, if fiscal consolidation 
is inevitable, then spending-based fiscal consolidation may be less 
harmful to the economy.
The results of estimation are the same when the effects of fiscal 
consolidation are investigated after dividing the variables by the level of 
perceived sovereign default risk. 
 
2 2
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reSultS of Gmm eStimation ConSiderinG the CompoSition of fiSCal 
ConSolidation
Dependent variable: g









































No. of observations 544
Instruments for first 
differences equation
Standard:
D.(abfc_hd, labfc_hd, l2abfc_hd abfc_ld, labfc_ld, 
l2abfc_ld)
GMM-type: L(2/5).(L.g L2.g)
Wald test: χ2(k) 668.17 (8)
(0.000)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 
in first differences
Z = –7.53 (p-value = 0.000)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 
in first differences
Z = –1.10 (p-value = 0.272)
Notes: 1.  The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here 
to save space. 
          2.  ***, **, and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
          3. P denotes p-value.
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 –p, β1, p, is the effects of a high-sovereign 




 –p, β2, p, is the 
effects of a low-sovereign risked one. 
The results of the estimation are shown in Table 7. Based on these 
results, fiscal consolidations in time of low sovereign default risk 
periods exert significant negative effects on GDP growth, whereas those 
in time of high sovereign default risk periods exert insignificant negative 
effects on economic activity.
VI. Robustness Checks
The robustness of the results discussed in the previous section 
Table 7
reSultS of Gmm eStimation ConSiderinG the perCeived SovereiGn riSK
Dependent variable: g









































No. of observations 544
Instruments for first 
differences equation
Standard:
D.(abfc_hr, labfc_hr, l2abfc_hr abfc_lr, labfc_lr,  
l2abfc_lr)
GMM-type: L(2/5).(L.g L2.g)
Wald test: χ2(k) 662.91 (8) (p-value =0.000)
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences
Z = –7.57 (p-value = 0.000)
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences
Z = –1.27 (p-value = 0.204)
Notes: 1.  The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here 
to save space. 
          2.  ***, **, and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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depends on how independent variables have been controlled during 
estimation (Briotti 2005). In this section, we recheck whether fiscal 
consolidation exerts either non-Keynesian effects or contractionary 
effects on economic activity by performing several different tests. 
First, the two variable VAR models of GDP growth rate (g) and size of 
action-based fiscal consolidation are estimated, allowing for the effects 
of a lagged growth rate and past action-based fiscal consolidation 
on current fiscal consolidation. The action-based fiscal consolidation 
variable is ordered first, followed by the GDP growth rate variable. 
Figure 2 shows that private consumption and GDP growth respond 
negatively to fiscal consolidation. The results of the VAR model also 
support the view that fiscal consolidation has contractionary effects on 
economic activity. The estimated effects of 1 per cent fiscal consolidation 
of GDP on private consumption and GDP in the first and second years 
are –0.004 per cent (t-statistic = –3.34) and –0.002 per cent (t-statistic = 
–6.29), respectively.
Second, the effects of fiscal consolidation on the labor market can 
be measured using a dynamic panel data GMM model. The results of 
the estimation are shown in Table 8. In the case of the difference GMM 
estimator, the coefficients of contemporaneous fiscal consolidation 
(ABFCt) on the unemployment rate (UNR) are positive and significant 
at the 1 per cent significance level. The results of the system GMM 
estimator are similar to those of the difference GMM estimator, 
illustrating that fiscal consolidation raises the unemployment rate 
Figure 2
reSponSeS to CholeSKy one S.d. innovationS ± 2S.e.
Response of Privat Consumption to Fiscal Consolidation Response of GDP to Fiscal Consolidation
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Table 8









































No. of observations 543 543 561





























Notes: 1.  The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here 
to save space. 
          2.  ***, **, and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
          3. p-values are in parentheses.
          4.  The Wald statistic is a test of the joint significance of the independent 
variables asymptotically distributed as χ2k under the null of no 
relationship, where k is the number of coefficients estimated (excluding 
time dummies).
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Table 9
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EXCHEB - - -0.0001**
(0.024)
- -
UNR - - - -0.0020***
(0.007)
-
IIR - - - 0.0004
(0.295)
No. of observations 543 541 543 543 479
Wald test: χ2(k) 603.38 (5) 693.17 (6) 684.51 (6) 736.20 (6) 853.53 (6)
Notes: 1.  The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here 
to save space. 
          2.  ***, **, and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
          3. p-values are in parentheses. 
          4.  The Wald statistic is a test of the joint significance of the independent 
variables asymptotically distributed as χ2k under the null of no 
relationship, where k is the number of coefficients estimated (excluding 
time dummies).
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significantly. Moreover, the results support our empirical finding that 
fiscal consolidation exerts negative effects on economic activity.
Third, several control variables are added to address the possibility 
that the baseline equation omits variables affecting economic activity, 
which are correlated with fiscal consolidation. The omitted variables 
can be a number of additional non-policy factors, such as long-term 
interest rates (IRL), nominal effective exchange rates (EXCHEB),19 UNR, 
and perceived sovereign default risk. As for the sovereign default risk, 
the IIR index20 is used as a proxy measure of the perceived sovereign 
default risk, following Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) and 
Eichengreen, and Mody (2004). The results of the estimation are 
shown in Table 9. The results are also similar to those of the baseline 
equation.21 The changes in interest, exchange, and unemployment rates 
help to cushion or mitigate the negative effect of fiscal consolidation on 
economic growth. 
VII. Conclusion 
This paper has investigated whether expansionary fiscal consolidation 
exists using dynamic panel data analysis with GMM estimation. 
Although the non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidation is 
theoretically reasonable and attractive, obtaining empirical evidence is 
challenging because of the difficulty of gaining credibility for the policy 
(Prammer 2004). A reform process on the basis of fiscal consolidation 
alone, in the middle of an economic crisis, can be exposed to the risk 
of self-defeating. Fiscal consolidation in an economic recession may 
lead domestic demand to fall into line with consumers’ rising concerns 
about job security and disposable incomes, thus reducing national tax 
revenues. 
According to the estimates of dynamic panel data analysis with GMM 
estimation, fiscal consolidation is not expansionary in terms of GDP growth 
19 A rise of nominal effective exchange rates indicates an appreciation of the 
Korean won.
20 The ratings are based on assessments of sovereign risk by private sector 
analysts. They rate each country on a scale of 0 to 100, with a rating of 100 
assigned to the lowest perceived sovereign default risk probability. 
21 The results are the same when two lags of the additional control variable are 
implemented in the equation.
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but rather contractionary. Unlike the ideas of non-Keynesian effects, our 
empirical estimates show that fiscal consolidation reduces the GDP growth 
rate significantly. The view that fiscal consolidation may stimulate the 
economy in the short term cannot be supported. This outcome is in line with 
the suggestion of the IMF (2010). 
Both the Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimation and Blundell-Bond 
system GMM estimation show that fiscal consolidation exerts significant 
negative effects on economic growth. The results are similar when the 
baseline model is extended by considering several factors.
According to the results produced by extension models, fiscal consolidation 
during high debt-to-GDP ratios exerts less negative effects on economic 
growth than that during low debt-to-GDP ratios. In addition, fiscal 
consolidation based on the spending cuts is less damaging to the economy 
than that based on tax hikes. Moreover, fiscal consolidation when the 
sovereign default risk is high is less costly to economic growth than that 
when the sovereign default risk is low.
(Received 3 May 2016; Revised 21 July 2016; Accepted 18 August 2016)
Appendix
A. Various Ways of Measuring CAPB
The CAPB is calculated by deriving the actual primary balance (non-
interest government revenue minus non-interest government spending) 
and subtracting the estimated effect of business cycle fluctuations on 
fiscal accounts (IMF 2010). Cyclical adjustment of fiscal variables uses 
three approaches. 
A.1. Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick, and Prescott 1980; Kydland, 
and Prescott 1990) 
This smoothing approach computes the cyclically adjusted measure 
(yt
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The crucial point in the application of the HP filter is the choice of the 
weighting factor, determining the degree of smoothness. In the case of 
annual data, λ is set to 100.
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A.2. Elasticity approach 
Cyclically adjusted series are computed on the basis of the elasticity 
of each budgetary category with regard to the potential or trend output. 
The approach has been used by the OECD, the IMF, and the EC (Giorno 
et al. 1995; Alesina et al. 2002). The main criticism of this approach is 
that the elasticities are assumed constant over time. The results also 
depend on the estimates of the potential output, specifically the natural 
unemployment rate and capital stock. 
 Fiscal Impulse = [(Gt – Tt) – (Gt  –1 (1 + ŷt) – (Tt –1 (1 + yt))]/Yt –1,
where Gt is the total current expenditure plus gross capital accumulation 
less interest payments, Tt is total revenues, Yt is the nominal GDP, ŷt 
is the growth rate of nominal potential GDP, and yt is growth rate of 
nominal GDP.
A.3. Blanchard Fiscal Impulse (BFI) 
Blanchard (1993) proposes that the discretionary shock should be 
estimated as the difference between the actual policy and the policy 
that prevails under the previous year’s growth rate. 
 Fiscal Impulse = (gt (Ut  –1) – tt) – (gt  –1 – tt  –1),
where gt and tt represent the GDP ratio of Gt and Tt, respectively, and Ut 
is the unemployment rate.
Alesina, and Perotti (1995) employ the methodology and calculate 
what the tax revenues and transfer payments would have been if the 
unemployment rate had remained the same as in the previous year, 
suggesting that the other spending categories move independently of the 
business cycle. The fiscal impulse is then constructed as the difference 
between this unemployment-adjusted primary deficit in period t and 
the previous period’s structural budget balance. Following the method’s 
principle, only the fiscal impulse for government spending could be 
calculated. The BFI is a poor measure if discretionary policy changes 
are correlated with the unemployment rate and appear as though they 
are induced by cyclical fluctuations. Additionally, the BFI is not entirely 
suitable for international comparisons because the unemployment rate 
is not measured similarly in different countries (Neicheva 2006).
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B. Sensitivity Analysis with Alternative Debt-to-GDP Criteria 
In Section III-B.(b), we extended the baseline model by dividing the 
fiscal consolidation sample into two sub-samples, according to the level of 
the debt-to-GDP ratio: 90 per cent. However, this threshold, 90 per cent 
of GDP, is arbitrary to a certain degree. Assessing whether the results 
are sensitive to changes in the threshold is necessary. We changed our 
thresholds variously from 60 per cent to 90 per cent. Appendix Table 
1 shows that the results are sensitive to the alternative criteria for the 
debt-to-GDP ratio. As the threshold lowers, the negative effects of fiscal 
consolidation on GDP growth become similar, regardless of sub-samples.
appendix Table 1













































































No. of observations 544
Instruments for first 
differences equation
Standard:
D.(abfc_hd, labfc_hd, l2abfc_hd abfc_ld, labfc_ld, l2abfc_ld)
GMM-type: L(2/5).(L.g L2.g)
Notes: 1.  The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here 
to save space.
          2.  ***, **, and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance levels, respectively.
          3. Standard errors in parentheses.
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C. Results of FD2SLS 
The results of 2SLS model are rather similar to those of dynamic 
panel data difference GMM. 
appendix Table 2
reSultS of the fd2SlS and dynamiC panel data differenCe Gmm
Dependent 
variable: g





























































Notes: 1.  The time dummies are included in all equations but are not shown here 
to save space.
          2.  ***, **, and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
          3. p-values are in parentheses. 
          4.  The Wald statistic is a test of the joint significance of the independent 
variables asymptotically distributed as χ2k under the null of no 
relationship, where k is the number of coefficients estimated (excluding 
time dummies).
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appendix Table 3
fiSCal ConSolidation epiSodeS (fCe): Both on the CapB-BaSed and poliCy 
aCtion-BaSed approaCh
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Korea - - - - -
Notes: based on Afonso, and Jalles (2012).
IMF(2010) - measure computed by Leigh et al. (2010): so-called policy action-based 
approach to account for consolidation episodes.
IMF(2011) - measure computed by Leigh et al. (2011).
FCE1 - measure based on Giavazzi and Pagano (1996): the cumulative change in 
the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance is at least 5, 4, or 3 percentage 
points of GDP in 4, 3, or 2 successive years, respectively, or 3 percentage points in 
one year. 
FCE2 - measure based on Alesina, and Ardagna (1998): the change in the cyclically 
adjusted primary budget balance is at least 2 percentage points of GDP in one 
year or at least 1.5 percentage points on average in the last two years.
FCE3 - measure based on Afonso (2010): a fiscal episode occurs when either the 
change in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance is at least one standard 
deviation on average in the last two years.
appendix Table 3
(Continued)
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